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 Today, thirty-eight countries in Sub-Saharan
African are classified as low-income countries,
eleven are middle-income countries, and only
one is a high-income country; GNP per capita
measured in terms of PPP is $1440 in Africa,
compared to the world average of $6300;
thirty-three of the forty-eight countries
designated as least developed by the UN are
African; and thirty-four of the forty-two
countries covered by the HIPC-initiative are
African.2These numbers illustrate that it does
seem like Africa is being marginalized in the
world economy, and that the question which
makes up the subtitle of this paper is of
immense importance. Needless to say,
answering it is an exceedingly difficult task.
Clearly, no monocausal theory is – or will ever
be – able to tell us the full story. The situation
is complicated by the fact that whereas we, in
an ideal world, would be able to take the
various theories to data on incomes and their
postulated determinants, in the real world, we
often do not have information about many of
the variables deemed important by theorists.
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2. Throughout this paper, Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa are used synonymously. 
Africa is the poorest region the world, and appears to be slipping further behind. This essay
explores and systematises the literature that deals with why this is so. Four major lessons
are suggested. The first is that the history and geography of Africa constitute impediments
to economic development; the second is that in many African states growth-retarding
policies have been pursued; and the third that there are intimate links between the region’s
structural characteristics and its policy regimes. These three conclusions hint at an African
poverty trap. The fourth lesson is that it is up to the Africans themselves to prove this 
proposition wrong. JEL-codes: O1, O2, O3, O4
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ing countries is generally poor, and African
data is certainly no exception to this rule. 
Thus my aim is a modest one: it is to sys-
tematically review the factors emphasised in
the academic literature on this subject.3 This
literature, which is both voluminous and
rapidly expanding, already contains several
excellent reviews by economists as well as
other social scientists. My contribution is
more in terms of an overall framework illus-
trating the interrelationships among the vari-
ous explanatory factors, as well as in modest
changes in focus. Relative to economists such
Collier and Gunning (1999a), for example, I
put somewhat greater emphasis on the long
shadows cast by history through the impact of
colonialism on the character of the current
African states. Relative to other social scien-
tists such as Chabal and Daloz (1999), I nat-
urally focus on economic mechanisms to a
greater extent, and rely more on quantitative
evidence.
Figure 1 presents an outline of my explana-
tory framework. I will start by discussing the
two primary sources of structural features of
African societies, namely geography and his-
tory. These combined to shape the initial con-
ditions facing the newly independent African
states: their endowments of economic
resources as well as the social, economic, and
political institutions in place. Since structural
characteristics change only slowly, it is possi-
ble that they have continued to exert an influ-
ence on African economic development from
the 1960s to date. However, even if institu-
tions are not rapidly changeable, they are not
written in stone either. Likewise, endowments
do change over time. Moreover, they are influ-
enced by economic policies and market struc-
tures. Hence, I have included the possibility
of feedback from the consequences generated
by institutions and endowments to their
determinants. Economic policies, discussed in
section 3, play a particularly important role in
this respect. Various explanations for the gen-
erally dysfunctional policies that have been
pursued by governments in post-indepen-
dence Africa are surveyed in section 4. In sec-
tion 5 I discuss the role of external actors in
general and aid donors in particular. Section




Table 1, which is based on Maddison (1995),
displays data for the per capita income level in
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3. Needless to say, within the constraints of this article I will have to talk about African countries in fairly general
terms, try to describe an “average” and compare it with other regions of the world, something that will inevitably
mask differences within Africa.
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1992. We see from the table that the average
income in Africa has always been below the
world average in the period covered. Indeed,
it is actually below the average income in the
other regions in every year except 1950. In this
sense, the marginal position of Africa in the
world economy is nothing new.4This suggests
that there is something intrinsic to the African
condition, so to speak, which hinders eco-
nomic development. In fact, many empirical
studies of economic growth have found that
after controlling for various explanatory vari-
ables a dummy variable for African countries
is negative and statistically significant. What
basic factors might explain the enduring
lagging of Africa? As suggested in figure 1, the
history and the geography of the continent are
prime suspects. I will discuss these in turn
before I end this section by looking at three
features of contemporary Africa that are func-
tions of both. 
Colonialism
One peculiarity of the African continent is
that its territory was almost completely colo-
nialised by various European powers. There
are arguments – such as the resource transfers
that took place from the colonies to their
rulers – which suggest that colonialism has
contributed to the low levels of income we
observe today. However, there are also argu-
ments to the contrary, for example, that the
colonial powers created physical infrastruc-
tures such as ports and railways that they
bequeathed to the new independent states.
Moreover, the issue that we would like to
resolve is whether these countries are better or
worse off today than they would have been if
they had not been colonised at the end of the
last century. Unfortunately, the counter-
factual can never be established with any
reasonable degree of accuracy and so there will
always be room for debate about the net
economic effects of colonialism.
However, I think a persuasive case can be
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4. Furthermore, here the countries of North Africa are included. These countries, which are usually separated from
the states of Sub-Saharan Africa for analytical purposes, a convention that I adhere to in this paper, are gener-
ally more affluent than their southern neighbours.
Table 1.
GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars
Year Western Western Southern Eastern Latin
Europe offshoots Europe Europe America Asia Africa Average
1820 1292 1205 806 750 715 550 450 661
1870 2110 2440 1111 1030 800 580 480 920
1913 3704 5237 1753 1557 1515 742 575 1592
1950 5123 9255 2025 2604 2614 727 792 2238
1973 12288 16075 6029 5742 4750 1680 1274 4329
1992 17384 20850 8273 4608 5294 3239 1318 5539
Source: table 1.2, p. 20 in Maddison (1995).
Notes: Western Offshoots are Canada, USA, Australia, and New Zealand. Africa includes countries north of Sahara.
04 NOPEC 28 (2) Hagen  11.12.02  12:11  Side 149made for negative effects of colonialism on the
post-independence economic development of
Sub-Saharan Africa via the institutions of
governance bequeathed to the Africans. While
there are contrarian voices, an accumulating
body of research documents the impact of the
colonial state on the political and bureaucratic
institutions of the new states. Englebert
(2000: 1823) puts it this way:5
“Of all the regions in the world, Africa has
the highest proportion of countries where the
process of state creation was exogenous to
their societies and where the leadership, or
ruling class, inherited the state rather than
shaping it as an instrument of its existing or
developing hegemony. … Even those who
benefited from chiefly status in customary
systems did not enjoy nationwide founda-
tions to their power by virtue of the hetero-
geneity of the pre-colonial systems comprised
in the state. … The state became therefore
either a potential resource to be appropriated,
or the possible instrument of the domination
of other groups to be resisted.” 
I will argue that this is a major reason why
African post-colonial states are more accu-
rately described as “predatory” rather than
“developmental”, focused on resource extrac-
tion and redistribution towards narrow
powerful groups instead of broad-based accu-
mulation. Frequently noted characteristics of
African countries over the last four decades
such as heavy taxation of export agriculture
(and urban bias more generally), rampant
corruption, and excessive debt accumulation
might reasonably be seen as the consequences
of the artificial nature of the state in a context
where the allegiance of most individuals is not
to the “nation”, but to family, kin, or religious
or ethnic group. Moreover, the arbitrary
borders imposed by the colonial powers are
also arguably a major reason why violent
conflict has been commonplace in Africa after
independence in every possible form: coups,
rebellions, and wars. Empirical studies show
that poverty feeds violence (see e.g. Collier
and Hoeffler 2000 and Elbadawi and Samba-
nis 2000) and that political instability in
general and political violence in particular
inhibits investment and growth (c.f. Alesina
et al. 1996 and Alesina and Perotti 1996).
Hence, this might be a mechanism that traps
African countries at a low level of economic
development. 
There is in fact some quantitative evidence
from regressions that supports this line of
thinking. Englebert (2000) finds that his
dummy variable for state legitimacy has
statistically significant explanatory power in
growth regressions covering up to one
hundred and thirty-three countries from
1960 (or independence) until 1992. Greater
legitimacy translates into higher rates of
growth, and, moreover, eliminates the signif-
icance of the infamous Africa dummy. Bertoc-
chi and Canova (1996) find that several
features of an African country’s colonial status
help explain its growth performance after
independence. Specifically, they argue that
dependencies did better than colonies and
150 Rune Jansen Hagen
5. Several historians of colonialism argue in a similar vein. For example, Fieldhouse (1986: 56) is of the opinion
that “… only a very partial metamorphosis of the colonial state and society had taken place before decolonisa-
tion; the new nation state inherited a tradition of autocracy barely tempered by democracy and a society united
only in the now irrelevant call to eject the imperialists.” Similarly, Young (1994: 283) asserts that “… the colo-
nial state during its phase of construction in most cases created entirely novel institutions of domination and
rule. Although we commonly described the independent polities as “new states,” in reality they were successors
to the colonial regime, inheriting its structures, its quotidian routines and practices, and its more hidden
normative theories of governance.”
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than Italian and Portuguese ones. Grier
(1999) also presents evidence supporting the
proposition that the identity of the colonising
power has mattered for growth rates. In his
sample, British ex-colonies did better than
Spanish ex-colonies over 1961–1990, and
these in turn outperformed those that had
been colonised by France. Finally, Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2000) show that the
mortality rates of European settlers at the time
of colonisation affect the level of income per
capita of the colony in 1995. Their claim is
that where the environment was inhospitable
to permanent European settlements, the
Europeans set up extractive institutions whose
negative effects have persisted until today.
Where the colonisers could establish perma-
nent settlements (such as in Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the US), however,
they imported the good governance structures
of their mother countries to a great extent.
The degree of institutional inertia posited
by Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2000)
is clearly extreme. There are also potential
problems with these studies, as with most
regression analyses.6However, even those who
do not find these results as persuasive as I do,
will have a hard time arguing that the low qual-
ity of African political and bureaucratic insti-
tutions has not affected economic develop-
ment on the continent over the recent decades. 
Location and Physical Geography
Even though the exact numbers in table 1 are
extremely uncertain estimates, there is little
reason to doubt that Africa was the poorest
region of the world even before its societies
were subjugated to European rule. Most
depressingly, after forty years of independence
and very substantial amounts of foreign aid,
the average income in Africa is only about the
same as that of Western Europe in the first
decades of the nineteenth century! A second
characteristic of Sub-Saharan Africa that
merits attention in this connection is its
physical geography. Climate, soils, location,
and the like have recently attracted consider-
able interest from economists trying to
explain cross-country variations in income
levels and growth rates. 
For instance, Bloom and Sachs (1998)
argue convincingly that climatic factors serve
to reduce the productivity of man, land, and
farm animals in the tropics. The favourable
conditions created for such debilitating
diseases as malaria, river blindness, and sleep-
ing sickness exemplify these problems. Other
drawbacks include poor soils, low and highly
variable rainfall, and plant pests. Since Africa
has the highest proportion of the population
in the Tropics of any major world region, it is
particularly poorly endowed by Mother
Nature in this respect.7 In fact, Bloom and
Sachs (1998) claim that for important food
crops such as cereals yields are lower in the
tropics, with Africa below even the tropical
average. Moreover, with large areas being of a
marginal character in terms of agriculture,
population densities have been low in many
parts of the continent. In 1998 the region had
26.6 people per square kilometre, compared
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6. For instance, Englebert sees legitimacy as being a function of the degree to which the state is rooted in pre-
colonial political institutions. While this might be a reasonable definition, a potential weakness of his empiri-
cal analysis is that the legitimacy variable is a subjective measure constructed by himself. 
7. When the Tropics are defined to be the area between the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn, 91% of the land area
of Sub-Saharan Africa lies therein (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1998: 66). This is much more than the region
with the second highest percentage, Latin America (73%). Using ecological measures of the Tropics, the per-
centage drops to 62% (Mellinger, Sachs, and Gallup 1999: 25). In this case Africa is surpassed by South Asia
(70%), but is still far above the world average of 40%.
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densities limit market size, which in turn
lowers rates of technological innovation. In
combination with poor infrastructure, this
also creates natural market segmentation
through high transport costs.
In addition, Bloom and Sachs (1998) list
six important difficulties for transport within
and out of Africa, among them large distances
from major world markets, the highest pro-
portion of landlocked states of any continent,
and the absence of rivers which are navigable
by ocean-going vessels into the interior of the
continent. These factors increase transport
costs and thus serve to reduce the profitability
of trade both within the continent and with
the rest of the world. Studies demonstrate that
these effects can be sizeable. For example,
UNCTAD (1999a) presents data indicating
that total freight costs on imports as a per-
centage of import value is more than 11% in
Africa compared to a developing country aver-
age of 8%, and asserts that in thirty-one out
of forty-three countries costs were fifty per-
cent higher than the latter figure. More
generally, Radelet and Sachs (1998) show that
natural geography has a strong influence on
shipping costs, with high shipping costs in
turn causing low growth of manufactured
exports and GDP per capita.
That there is something to this line of rea-
soning is almost self-evident. As John
Kenneth Gailbraith (1951: 693) put it fifty
years ago: “if one marks off a belt a couple of
thousand miles in width encircling the earth
at the equator one finds no developed coun-
tries … Everywhere the standard of living is
low and the span of human life is short”
(quoted in Kamarck 1976: 4). While his
bandwidth is too large today because of the
rapid growth of the countries of South-Eastern
Asia, Mellinger, Sachs, and Gallup (1999)
calculate that in 1995 the average income of
temperate regions measured in terms of
purchasing power was four and a half times
that of tropical ones. Factoring in the distrib-
ution of the population between the coast and
the interior, they find that areas in the tem-
perate zone lying within one hundred kilo-
metres of the coast have six times the GDP per
capita of interior tropical regions. As Sub-
Saharan Africa has the highest proportion of
its population in non-coastal tropical areas of
any continent, I think that the evidence serves
to demonstrate that this structural factor is
part of the answer why Africa is so poor.8
Moreover, it seems capable of explaining why
the continent stays poor as well: Sachs and
Warner (1997) demonstrate that tropical
location and landlockedness contribute to
explaining the slow growth of African
economies over 1965–90.9
Nevertheless, while important, the case for
geography as a determinant of Africa’s low lev-
els of income could be overstated.10For exam-
ple, while the continent’s disease ecology
152 Rune Jansen Hagen
8. If one takes a really long-run view of human history, it might also explain why Africa was colonised by the Euro-
peans (Diamond 1999: 398-399): ”Europeans entering Africa enjoyed the triple advantage of guns and other
technology, widespread literacy, and the political organization necessary to sustain expensive programs of explo-
ration and conquest. ... [A]ll three arose historically from the development of food production. But food pro-
duction was delayed in Sub-Saharan Africa (compared with Eurasia) by Africa’s paucity of domesticable native
animal and plant species, its much smaller area suitable for indigenous food production, and its north-south
axis, which retarded the spread of food production and inventions.”
9. Similarly, in the regressions of Bloom and Sachs (1998), the percentage of land area in the tropics has a nega-
tive and the coastal population density a positive impact on growth in seventy-seven countries over 1965–90.
Both variables contribute to the lower rate observed in the African countries relative to the non-African ones.
10. See as well the comments by Collier and Udry on Bloom and Sachs (1998).
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health, which in turn is one explanation for
their low levels of income, the reverse is also
evidently true; poverty is a factor causing ill
health. Furthermore, the inadequate health
systems of African countries have undoubt-
edly contributed to the prevalence of diseases
that no longer poses a threat to public health
in other parts of the world. In turn, the sorry
state of health services is not only a function
of the low levels of revenues of African
governments; misplaced priorities and ineffi-
cient spending has played a role too. This is
important because policy failures might be
rectified, and the international community
can contribute so that poverty becomes less of
a constraint with respect to health status. The
same can be said of other consequences of the
location of Africa on the map of the world.
Hence, while geography is shaping and con-
straining African development, it is not
determining it.11 I return to the implications
of this important distinction in the final
section. In the remainder of this section I
demonstrate how Africa’s geography in com-
bination with its history have played major
roles in forming its most important socio-
economic characteristics, and show that 
post-independence policies have tended to
reinforce rather than counteract these forces.
History and Geography Combined I: 
Private Sector Institutions
It is arguably the case that Africa has some of
the strongest social institutions in the world.
These have played an important part in the
economies of the continent: family and kin-
ship groups have provided insurance against
idiosyncratic risks, effected intergenerational
redistribution, and helped manage common
pool resources. The origins of these arrange-
ments are to be found in the extreme risks
(especially the risk of starvation) facing indi-
viduals in pre-industrial societies living on the
margin of subsistence and lacking govern-
ments that could solve collective action prob-
lems through coercion.12 Since, as we have
seen, the natural conditions for agriculture
and animal husbandry have been un-
favourable in many parts of Africa, the need
for institutions that help alleviate the adverse
consequences of negative shocks to output has
been strong. Over the course of history this
probably helps explain why primordial affili-
ations have evolved to become focal points of
the economic lives of most individuals.13
While their importance remains particularly
strong in rural areas and in agriculture, they
are of note in the urban setting too, with social
networks influencing the workings of both
the manufacturing and the trade sector.
These institutions might be described as
constrained efficient. That is, they are efficient
given the environment in which they work,
but this does not mean that they have no costs
to go with their benefits. For example, since
insurance entails redistribution ex post, indi-
viduals who experience a bumper harvest
might find it optimal to renege on their
promise to distribute some of the excess over
their subsistence needs to members of their
network who have been less fortunate. This
type of moral hazard might be countered by
the threat of exclusion from the network in
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11. Furthermore, as noted by Collier and Gunning (1999a), fixed factors such as physical geography cannot readily
explain changes in economic performance over time.
12. See e.g. Posner (1980) and Fafchamps (1992).
13. Functionalism is of course an ever-present danger in these types of explanations. However, Collier and Gunning
(1999a: 79) argue that there are variations in social arrangements across lowland and highland areas in Africa
which are explicable in terms of differences in the conditions facing agriculture.
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is static. However, if individuals are able to
accumulate assets and thus self-insure against
future negative shocks, the threat might not
be sufficient to stop them from opting out of
the solidarity network. Therefore, the accu-
mulation of wealth has often been viewed as
socially unacceptable (and has faced social
sanctions), which of course has a clear cost
from a social point of view. 
Such costs of constrained efficiency arise
in the “modern sectors” as well.14 Of course,
in general the specific sources of uncertainty
that make personalised long-term relation-
ships the preferred mode of operation in these
settings differ. However, generically they are
equivalent. For example, in the same way as
the lack of government in primitive societies
precludes compulsory insurance and thus
force people to substitute blood ties and social
sanctions for government fiat, the fact that
public institutions do not function properly
with respect to contract enforcement is one
major reason why entrepreneurs need to
devise their own ways to guard against moral
hazard in business. But even though these
mechanisms provide private benefits by
reducing transaction costs, they lead to social
costs through lost gains from trade: when rela-
tionships are valuable because they save on
search and screening costs, they might prevent
outsiders from entering the market and insid-
ers from grasping new business opportunities.
The most extraordinary example of the
impact of the environment on the formation
of social institutions is what many consider to
be the archetypical African community: the
tribe. Firstly, the low population density pro-
duced by its physical geography is probably
the major reason why Africa has the highest
level of ethnolinguistic fragmentation of any
region in the world. Secondly, it is often held
that groups founded on primordial ties are
immutable. However, many current African
tribes, while to some extent based on prior
affiliations, were formed in response to the
occupation by Africa of the colonial powers
(see e.g. Davidson 1992). That is, they were
constituted as political coalitions to enhance
the bargaining power of Africans relative to
the Europeans.
I will return to the discussion of the role
played by these ethnic groups or coalitions in
the public sphere below. Here it suffices to
note that recent research seems to indicate
that ethnicity only plays an indirect role in the
private sector. That is, ethnicity facilitates the
formation and strengthening of business net-
works because of the importance of personal
referral in establishing contacts and socialis-
ing in perpetuating economic relationships,
and both of these processes often take place
within ethnic groups. This might be due to
ethnic groups as such being too large to pro-
vide the foundation for personalised
exchange. On the other hand, there is some
evidence that the family, albeit being a much
smaller group, plays a minor role in market
exchange as well. Family members might help
entrepreneurs in establishing their firms (by
providing loans, for example), work with
them, or be a source of business through refer-
ral. Other than that, entrepreneurs seem to
prefer to keep business outside the family. A
likely explanation is that their social obliga-
tions interfere with how they might operate in
markets, for example because they are obliged
to provide family or kin with goods at below
market prices.
These observations suggest the somewhat
154 Rune Jansen Hagen
14. Confer e.g. Fafchamps (1996, 1999, 2000), Fafchamps and Minten (1999, 2001), Fafchamps, Gunning, and
Oostendorp (2000), and Bigsten et al. (2000a).
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social institutions, although being adapted to
the problems facing static agricultural soci-
eties, are not well suited to modern economic
life. Their emphasis on redistribution taxes
entrepreneurship, innovation, and wealth
accumulation. While they might form the
basis of networks of personalised exchange,
such networks limit the scope of the market,
reduce competition, and hinder diversifica-
tion into new types of activities.15 Still, it is
important to note that these arrangements are
endogenous to weaknesses in public sector
institutions, and therefore likely to change if
for instance the rule of law could be more
firmly established in African states.
History and Geography Combined II:
Landlocked Countries 
In many discussions of the special problems
of landlocked countries, an implicit view
seems to be that these are caused solely by their
geography. But this is only partly true, because
some trade costs are incurred when goods are
crossing the borders of transit countries.
Examples are duties to the governments of
transit countries, costs of delays involved in
clearing customs, and bribes to customs offi-
cials and employees of publicly owned
providers of transport services in order to
ensure a speedy transit (UNCTAD 1999a,b).
Thus, the arbitrary carving out of the African
continent into juridical entities performed by
the colonial powers, which has left so many
African countries without access to the ocean,
is partly to blame for the fact that their inter-
national trade is costly. This drawback is
rendered even more disadvantageous by
another consequence of the quest for colonies,
namely, that most African states are small in
terms of population. Close to 50% of the pop-
ulation lives in the five largest states, and
twenty-two countries have a population of less
than five million. This means that the domes-
tic markets are small, which in turn makes
international trade more important for the
level of welfare that can be achieved. When
cross-border trade is made less profitable due
to the problems connected with long dis-
tances and border transit, many Africans are
thus doubly disadvantaged by the arbitrary
borders that have been imposed on them. 
Still, African governments are not thereby
exonerated of blame. UNCTAD (1999a)
claims that in Africa, intra-national transport
costs are for the most part higher than inter-
national transport costs. This partly reflects
the fact that transport infrastructure is lacking
in both quantity and quality. While factors
such as low population densities contribute to
making it costly to build adequate infrastruc-
tures and low levels of income and rudimen-
tary tax systems make public funds scarce, the
story is hardly complete without adding fail-
ures of policies and governance in the post-
independence period (UNCTAD 1999a: 11):
“[transport s]ervices were expensive and unre-
liable because of a lack of commercial orien-
tation, the absence of competition, cumber-
some regulations which too often served as
opportunities for petty corruption, and incen-
tive structures which often favoured inertia
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15. Platteau (1994: 552-553) reasons in a similar manner: ”[t]hrough personalisation and clientelisation of their
relations with trade partners, members of traditional societies have thus succeeded in establishing and sustain-
ing the trust required for more or less stable economic exchanges to take place. Yet, precisely because of the way
followed to solve the trust problem, the scale of these exchanges is necessarily restricted: in other words, limita-
tions on the size of the (natural) community space as well as on the scope of personalised relations with non-
community members … lead to a situation in which only a few trade opportunities are captured. Obviously,
the division of labour cannot be developed very far in such a context.”
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parastatals often drained rather than con-
tributed to public finance, and there were
muddled priorities, including urban bias in
the provision of infrastructure and neglect in
the maintenance of existing infrastructures.”
Hence, even though the problems of land-
locked countries are for real, 16 and Africa has
many such states, the continent’s troubles can-
not be put down to structural factors alone.
History and Geography Combined III: 
Primary Commodity Dependence
Another characteristic feature of African
economies that is a function of natural
endowments, colonial history, and post-inde-
pendence policies is their extreme dependency
on a few primary commodities for most of
their export earnings. Since many African
countries are abundantly blessed with natural
resources, their static comparative advantage
in international trade is in the production of
primary commodities (Wood and Mayer
1998). The colonial powers did little to
change this, preferring their colonies to be
suppliers of raw materials to their own
markets and manufacturing industries. While
most African governments have pursued trade
and industrial policies aimed at fostering
domestic manufacturing and processing
industries, they have rarely succeeded in
achieving export diversification. Ng and Yeats
(1997) demonstrate that on average the oppo-
site is true: a strong concentration has taken
place. Whereas in 1962–64 the share of the
three largest products in total exports was
36.5% in Sub-Saharan Africa, it was 62.3%
in 1991–93.17 The numbers in table 3 in
Wood and Mayer (1998) show that in 1990
the share of total merchandise exports in the
region made up by unprocessed primary prod-
ucts was 76.1%. If one adds processed
primary products, the dependency of African
countries on such goods for their exports is
even more pronounced (87.8%).18
There are three major dimensions to this
dependence. Firstly, there is the debate over
whether economic development can be
engendered through resource-based growth.
The view that manufacturing is more
dynamic than agriculture was widespread at
the time that African states became indepen-
dent and has been influential throughout the
post-colonial period. Indeed, it has even
become ingrained in common parlance: the
term “industrialised countries” is often used
to denote rich countries. The presumption
that technological progress is faster in manu-
facturing than in agriculture has provided the
intellectual foundations for policies aimed at
favouring the former, usually at the expense of
the latter. However, the fact that rich coun-
tries are mostly industrial and poor countries
usually produce (unprocessed) primary com-
modities does not necessarily reflect causality,
nor does casual observation constitute proof
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16. For instance, Limao and Venables (1999) find that the median landlocked country in their sample has trans-
port costs which are 58% higher than the median coastal country and UNCTAD (1999a) show that for land-
locked Africa freight costs on imports relative to import value were more than seven percentage points higher
than the African average (which, as already noted, is in itself much higher than the developing country aver-
age).
17. According to Svedberg (1991), only two (Chad and Mauritius) out of the thirty-three countries in his Sub-Saha-
ran African sample diversified into manufacturing in 1970-85 compared to 1954-69.
18. In the following countries a single commodity constituted 75% or more of the total value of exports in 1990
(Deaton 1999, table 1): Angola (oil, 93%), Botswana (diamonds, 80%), Burundi (coffee, 75%), Chad (cotton,
85%), Congo (oil, 85%), Gabon (oil, 75%), Guinea (bauxite, 76%), Niger (uranium, 83%), Nigeria (oil, 96%),
and Zambia (copper, 88%).
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manufacturing. Martin and Mitra (2001)
actually produce evidence to the contrary,
namely that total factor productivity growth
has been significantly faster in agriculture over
the period 1967–92. Moreover, they find that
convergence in levels of agricultural produc-
tivity has been rapid across their sample coun-
tries, suggesting that innovations disseminate
fast. This is potentially good news to African
countries; as noted, agricultural productivity
is generally low there. It could be countered
that the green revolution largely passed the
continent by. However, this is probably due to
policy failures such as excessive taxation of
export agriculture and poor public services
(Collier and Gunning 1999a). 
How are we then to explain the finding
that countries with higher shares of natural
resources in exports tend to grow more slowly
(Sachs and Warner 1995, 1997)? The answer
seems to be that within the framework of the
weak political institutions of most African
countries, high levels of resource rents have
lead to wasteful rent-seeking by both peaceful
and violent means.19Once again there is some
hope hidden within the causes of despair,
because if better governance structures can be
constructed (admittedly a big if in the African
context) the bounties of nature might be
turned into the sources of prosperity they
should be.
Secondly, there is the longstanding con-
troversy over the path of the prices of primary
products relative to manufacturing. The
famous Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, formu-
lated in the 1950s, is that this path is down-
ward sloping due to for example the develop-
ment of synthetic substitutes for primary
products such as rubber and natural fibres. On
the other hand, theories that focus on non-
renewable resources predict that as these
resources are depleted, their relative price will
rise. The controversy over whether the com-
modity terms of trade are in a secular decline
or not has not been resolved (Deaton and
Miller 1996). Not surprisingly, the answer
depends on the period covered.20 More
importantly, not all developing countries rely
primarily on primary commodities for their
exports, and even among those that do, the
composition of their exports varies so much
that aggregate commodity price indices say
little about the evolution of the terms of trade
of a specific country.
According to Collier and Gunning
(1999a), there is a consensus that the terms of
trade of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa
have declined since the 1980s. However, the
estimated size of the decline varies from 6%
to 36%. In an earlier study, Gersovitz and
Paxson (1990) found that the real prices of a
range of commodities that are important in
Africa’s exports had all fallen over 1950–87.
Though, the changes were not statistically
significant. Cashin and Patillo (2000) uncover
little evidence of trends in the net barter terms
of trade of individual African countries over
1960–96, but note a weak tendency towards
decline for many of these since the late 1970s
or early 1980s. It is thus difficult to say
whether the level of primary product prices
has contributed to African poverty when one
considers changes over the last half of the 20th
century, but there is reason to believe that a
fall in the terms of trade is one cause of the
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19. See e.g. Mehlum and Moene (2001), Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2000), and Svensson (2000).
20. Bleaney and Greenaway (1993) find that over 1900-91 the commodity terms of trade were declining, but very
slowly, so that fluctuations around trends were much more important than the trend itself. Moreover, they show
that the size and statistical significance of the trend vary between sub-periods.
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last twenty years or so.
There is more evidence to the point that
the third feature of dependence on primary
products, that export earnings become highly
volatile, plays a significant part in depressing
levels of income and their growth rates in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Export earnings are volatile
due to a combination of quantity shocks, such
as crop failures caused by drought, and price
shocks, which in most cases can be considered
exogenous since generally African countries
are too small to affect world market prices.
The conventional wisdom has been that such
shocks inhibit growth. Deaton and Miller
(1996) have challenged that wisdom. They
find that the net impact of positive shocks to
commodity prices is to increase the level of
GDP in Africa. However, their methodology
assumes that prices revert to trend. While this
might be reasonable in many cases,21 it does
not allow them to capture long-term effects.
Other empirical studies do tend to confirm
the conclusion of Collier and Gunning
(1999b: 36): “[t]he overall effect of the typi-
cal positive shock in [our] sample is eventu-
ally substantially to reduce output, despite the
effect being strongly positive at the time of the
shock.” Available evidence suggests that this is
due to trade shocks having a negative impact
on the efficiency of investment.22
Thus, it is probably not coincidental that
in the post-independence period, African eco-
nomic performance has been weaker, on aver-
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21. In the sample of Cashin and Patillo (2000), about half of the countries experience short-lived shocks (four years
or less) to their terms of trade. For about one third the shocks are estimated to be permanent.
22. Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) uncover a weak negative effect of terms of trade volatility on GDP growth over
1980-95 in their panel of fourteen African countries; Guillaumont, Jeanneney, and Brun (1999) estimate that
this variable has a negative effect on growth in a sample of fifty-four developing countries (of which nearly half
are African) over 1970-80 and 1980-90; and Dawe (1996) find that instability of export revenues lower growth
in a cross-section of eighty-five countries for the years 1970-85. The first study does not register an impact of
terms of trade volatility on investment, whereas the last two find that investment is an increasing function of
instabilities with respect to trade so that the negative effect on growth is through investment efficiency. The
latter result seems intuitively reasonable, and is, moreover, in line with the case study evidence presented in
Collier, Gunning, and associates (1999).
Table 2.
Population-weighted growth rates of GDP per capita
1966–71 1971–76 1976–81 1981–86 1986–91 1991–96 1966–96
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.3 0.9 -0.8 -1.3 0.0 -0.7 0.0
Middle-East and North Africa 1.1 4.4 -1.0 0.8 -0.7 1.2 1.8
South Asia 1.0 -0.3 2.9 2.4 2.1 2.4 1.7
India 2.4 0.6 1.7 2.8 3.3 4.7 2.6
Latin America and Caribbean 3.8 4.0 2.0 -0.6 -0.1 1.4 1.8
OECD 4.0 2.5 1.9 1.9 2.2 1.4 2.3
East Asia and Pacific 4.0 4.4 5.0 6.6 4.5 5.3 4.3
China 4.1 1.0 7.0 9.7 6.4 11.2 6.5
Notes: GDP per capita is measured in constant local currency units.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from World Bank (1998).
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1970s these countries had to cope with both
the two oil price shocks, which affected most
of them negatively, as well as a boom in other
commodity prices, which increased the prices
of some major African export commodities
such as coffee. Moreover, the numbers in table
2 demonstrate that evaluated jointly, the
countries of Sub-Saharan African have not
managed to produce aggregate economic
progress since the mid-60s. Even worse, in the
last 20 years covered by the table GDP per
capita has fallen on average. This abysmal eco-
nomic performance has prompted statements
like “African economic history since 1960 fits the
classical definition of tragedy: potential unful-
filled, with disastrous consequences” (Easterly
and Levine 1997: 1203). It has also generated
an outpouring of academic and policy ori-
ented papers analysing what has gone wrong. 
Economic Policies and Growth 
Hares and tortoises in the growth race
Something has indeed gone wrong, for at the
beginning of the 1960s it was not given that
Africa should be a laggard in the growth race.
This can be exemplified by comparing Ghana
and South Korea. Ghana was the first colony
in Sub-Saharan Africa to become indepen-
dent. Under the leadership of the charismatic
Kwame Nkrumah, the country symbolised
the bright future of the countries on the con-
tinent. In 1960, the per capita GDP of Ghana
and South Korea were almost identical when
measured in terms of purchasing power. The
economic prospects of the latter did not seem
as promising as those of Ghana. On the con-
trary, suffering from a highly corrupt and inef-
ficient regime and facing the threat of the
communist North, South Korea seemed des-
tined for stagnation. That fate, however, befell
Ghana instead. Forty years later, having expe-
rienced no growth at all, it is still a low-income
country. South Korea, one the other hand, has
become both a high-income country and a
member of the OECD. 
The cases of Ghana and South Korea are
actually fairly representative of the contrast-
ing experiences of African and East Asian
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Table 3.
Growth rates of per capita GDP 1960-98
Slowest growth Fastest growth
Congo, Democratic Republic of -2.9 Botswana 6.4
Niger -1.7 Singapore 6.4
Sierra Leone -1.3 Korea, Republic of 5.9
Madagascar -1.2 Hong Kong 5.3
Zambia -1.2 China 5.1
Haiti -1.0 Thailand 4.6
Nicaragua -1.0 Japan 4.4
Central African Republic -0.8 St. Kitts and Nevis 4.2
Chad -0.6 Ireland 4.1
Rwanda -0.5 Portugal 4.0
Note: GDP is measured in constant local currency units.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from World Bank (2000).
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bles lists of the top and bottom ten countries
in terms of per capita GDP growth since the
1960s, the first list is invariably dominated by
the so-called miracle countries of South-
Eastern and Eastern Asia while the second
contains mostly African countries (c.f. table
3). However, the only real economic success
of post-independence Sub-Saharan Africa,
Botswana, is among the fastest growing
economies in the world over the last thirty to
forty years.23 Thus Botswana provides one of
the few bright spots in the gloomy overall
picture as seen from an African angle. I shall
return to the case of Botswana from time to
time, since the relevance of the experience of
a neighbour is more easily accepted, and the
likelihood of successful emulation much
greater.24
These individual country examples of
success and failure teach us two important
lessons. Firstly, the power of compound
growth rates is strong. I have noted that
Ghana could have been South Korea if it had
been able to replicate the performance of the
latter. Botswana’s phenomenal growth rate has
transformed it from a very poor country at
independence to a middle-income country by
1992, a time span of only twenty-seven years.
Thus, if one can unlock the secrets of gene-
rating growth, rapid improvements are possi-
ble, particularly if one starts from a low base. 
Secondly, part of the secret of Botswana’s
success is luck. It has discovered the world’s
largest deposits of diamonds. However, to me
(as well as to Rodrik 1998) this is less inter-
esting than the fact that it has managed its
newfound wealth well. Being richly endowed
with natural resources is not a necessary con-
dition for becoming a high-income country.
If it were, Japan would never have achieved
such a status. It is not sufficient either, because
then Nigeria would be one of the richest coun-
tries in the world and not one of the poorest,
which is in fact the case. Indeed, Nigeria, with
its rampant corruption and countless “white
elephants”, demonstrates that resource wealth
might in some cases actually be more of a curse
than a blessing. In my opinion, the case of
Botswana shows that through the judicious
application of economic policies it is possible
to realise the beneficial potential of windfalls
and to minimise the consequences of adverse
shocks. This is vital since we have noted that
African economies clearly are more exposed to
exogenous shocks than most other economies
in the world.
Capital accumulation in Africa
Accumulation necessitates abstaining from
consuming resources today so as to be able to
have greater consumption tomorrow. The
returns to postponing consumption are there-
fore crucial for private savings and investment
and, by implication, for economic growth. Of
course, being poor countries with little capi-
tal will not be able to save much in absolute
terms. Hence, if they have to rely on their own
resources, the level of accumulation will be
low too. African average savings rates are
indeed the lowest in the world. In the 1960s
and early 1970s, gross domestic savings were
remarkably stable at 16–18% of GDP. The
booms in commodity prices in the middle of
the 1970s seem to have resulted in an increase
in the savings rate by four to five percentage
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23. Mauritius and Lesotho are the second and third fastest growing countries in Sub-Saharan Africa over 1960–98.
However, at 3.4% and 3.2% respectively, their performances, though respectable, pale next to Botswana’s.
24. It should be noted that Botswana might only lead by example. It is too small and lacks the manufacturing base
necessary to be a “leading goose” such as for instance Taiwan has been in East Asia, transferring its unskilled
labour intensive industries to neighbouring countries as it has moved up the technology ladder.
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rate dropped precipitously to 15–17%. The
time-series on average national savings rates,
although somewhat shorter, follow a similar
trajectory.25
Elbadawi and Mwega (2000) find that in
Africa a rise in the savings rate Granger-causes
an increase in fixed investment. Thus, it is no
surprise to find both that investment rates in
Sub-Saharan Africa have fallen over time and
that they are low compared to other regions.
The discrepancy is particularly marked with
respect to rates of private investment; accord-
ing to some estimates, the African median was
only half of the median rate in East Asia
between 1970–90 and 50% below the Latin
American one (Serven 1997). The gap is not
quite as big when one looks at total invest-
ment, but, as we shall see, one should perhaps
not expect government investment to have
contributed very much to growth in the
African context.
Of course, a country need not necessarily
finance all of its investments on its own: the
potential growth differential between capital-
rich and capital-poor countries might be
realised through capital flows from the former
to the latter. Such flows might be public or
private and might come in the form of invest-
ments, loans, and grants. While the condi-
tions attached to the transfer will vary with the
sources and types of funds, if invested
efficiently all forms of international capital
flows can potentially raise the growth rate of
a recipient. Furthermore, if the returns to
capital are decreasing in the capital stock, as is
conventionally assumed, the returns to invest-
ing in poor countries should be very high.
One reason why there might be decreasing
returns at the economy-wide level is that it
seems reasonable to expect that the best
investment opportunities are exploited first.
Subsequent investment will therefore be in
projects with lower returns. If the set of possi-
ble projects is the same in all countries, poor
countries, which have less capital than rich
countries, should therefore have higher
returns to and rates of investment. It follows
that one should expect them to grow faster
too.26
Africa definitely has a low capital stock.
Recent estimates constructed by researchers at
the World Bank indicate that of all the regions
in what used to be called the Third World,
Sub-Saharan Africa has the lowest amount of
private capital per worker (Collier, Hoeffler,
and Pattillo 2001). It has actually less than half
of the capital/labour ratio of the region with
the second lowest ratio, South Asia, and less
than a third of that of the Middle East and
North Africa, which ranks third from bottom.
Moreover, according to these estimates Africa
is the region with the highest proportion of
flight capital, that is, investments abroad that
are not registered in public statistics, in private
real wealth (40%). This is so even though
these researchers find that other things being
equal flight capital is attracted to countries
with low capital/worker ratios. Hence there
seems to be something to the notion of
decreasing returns to capital, but apparently
this effect is mitigated by other factors in the
African context. 
These results on capital flight are strength-
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25. These numbers are from the World Bank (2000).
26. Another reason why poor countries could be able to grow faster than rich ones is that they can achieve techno-
logical progress through innovation instead of invention. The latter is presumably more costly. However, in
practice it is likely that innovation requires a certain level of development, at least with respect to human capital.
Hence, the low level of education in Africa (see below) is likely to constitute a barrier to exploiting opportuni-
ties for innovation through copying and imitation.
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They indicate that Sub-Saharan Africa
receives a minuscule share of the flows going
into developing countries. Worse, the
absolute size of these flows is small even com-
pared to the size of African economies. Dur-
ing 1990–93, for example, the combined
levels of private long-term net debt and equity
flows were only equal to 2.6% of exports and
0.8% of GNP (Fernandez-Arias and Montiel
1996). The impression given by figure 2 is that
there are some encouraging signs in recent
years. However, these are all due to the re-
integration of South Africa in the world
economy. For example, more than half of the
FDI in the peak year of 1997 flowed to South
Africa (much of it due to privatisation), and
most of the portfolio flows over 1994–98 were
destined for Johannesburg.27 The only series
that does not look worse without South Africa
included, is bank and trade-related lending,
because this country was borrowing more
than 2.5 billion USD over 1996–98. Still, it
is clear that the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa has
been effectively excluded from international
borrowing since the onset of the debt crisis.
Thus, neither international lenders nor inter-
national investors seem to find the economies
of Africa attractive in spite of the high returns
to capital indicated by their low capital/labour
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Figure 2.
Private capital flows to Sub-Saharan Africa













27. The World Development Indicators database does not include observations on financial flows to South Africa
before 1994. However, it seems safe to assume that these were negligible due to the sanctions against the apartheid
regime. This presumption is supported by the data on FDI presented by Pigato (2000) and UNCTAD (1999c),
which show that foreigners disinvested in South Africa in the 1980s.
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Lucas (Lucas 1990) the million-dollar ques-
tion is this: why hasn’t private capital flown
from rich to African countries?
To answer this question, recall our previ-
ous reasoning around why poor countries
might grow faster than rich ones. In addition
to the assumption of decreasing returns to
capital, there were two other assumptions;
namely, that investment opportunities are
identical across countries and that capital is
invested in an efficient manner. In practice,
both of these assumptions are untenable. First
of all, the set of possible investment projects
is not the same in all countries. To some extent
the natural resource base of Africa places it in
a relatively favourable position when it comes
to for example investment in resource inten-
sive industries. In fact, most of the FDI that
has been coming in outside South Africa 
has been going to resource rich countries in
the region.28 In the 1990s, this has mainly
benefited the oil producers Angola, Congo,
Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea. 
Moreover, in general the region is at a dis-
advantage with respect to foreign investment.
The lack of complementary inputs such as
infrastructure is surely one reason why this is
so. As already noted, public infrastructure is
both undersupplied and of poor quality in
Africa. Historically, the provision of infra-
structure has been seen as one of the major
tasks of governments. Available evidence
tends to confirm the importance of public
infrastructure investment. In a well-known
study, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find that
public investment in transport and commu-
nication is robustly related to the growth rate
of GDP per capita. Moreover, the combina-
tion of the poor quality of the existing stock
of infrastructure and the particular impor-
tance of improving communications in Africa
– as noted above its countries are generally
sparsely populated and many of them are
landlocked too – strengthens the need for
public investment in this sector. In this per-
spective, the spending of African governments
does not seem overly impressive.29
Another input that is complementary to
private investment in physical capital is
human capital. Of course, human capital
accumulation might also be an independent
source of economic growth. Here too, African
governments have played a major role through
their involvement in the provision of educa-
tion and health services. At the outset, the
newly independent states faced daunting tasks
in these sectors. For example, in many African
countries life expectancy at birth was well
below forty years in the early 1960s. Accord-
ing to the most recent version of the Barro-
Lee data set on educational attainment (Barro
and Lee 2001), in 1960 average years of total
schooling in African countries were only 1.39
for the population aged twenty-five and
above. 
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28. It could be argued, as do UNCTAD (1999c), that the inflows should be seen in relation to the size of the econ-
omy, which is small in many African countries. If one does, there are a number of countries without large mining
or petroleum sectors that have received sizeable amounts of FDI in recent years (also see Pigato 2000, whose
numbers differ quite a lot for some countries, probably due to different sources). 
29. Mlambo and Oshikoya (2001) find that in their sample of forty developing countries, of which fifteen are from
Sub-Saharan Africa, public investment has a non-significant impact on private investment in most of their econo-
metric specifications. It is encouraging, though, that the coefficient becomes significantly positive when the
sample period is shortened from 1970-96 to 1982-96. While the authors do not discuss why, the improvement
could be due to a combination of a less volatile external environment and the implementation of economic
reforms in the latter part of the 1980s and the 1990s. Hadjimichael et al. (1995) provide some indication that
the improvement also applies to African countries: over 1986-93, government investment in this region was
found to contribute positively and significantly to both private investment and economic growth. 
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strides with respect to health and education
since the 1960s, its countries still lag behind
compared to other developing countries (c.f.
table 4). In terms of spending levels, African
governments compare favourably with
governments in other regions of the develop-
ing world. However, rapid population
growth, which results in high dependency
ratios, and the HIV/AIDS-epidemic, magnify
the scale of the task they are facing.30
Furthermore, it is not difficult to find African
evidence that hints at the inputs into and out-
puts of the social sectors being misallocated.
Let me present three examples from the
education sector.
First of all, it is conventionally held that in
low-income countries the social returns to
primary education are much higher than the
returns to secondary and tertiary education.
While African countries do allocate a greater
share of public recurrent expenditure to
primary education than to higher education,
in 1990 public spending per student in the
latter was forty-four times spending per
student in the former (World Bank 1995a:
57-59). Thus, African governments seem to
have got their priorities wrong.
Secondly, weak governance systems in the
public sectors in many cases result in recorded
spending levels being highly misleading for
judging actual spending levels. A particular
egregious example of this is non-wage expen-
ditures in Uganda’s primary schools: during
1991–95, on average only 13% of what the
central government contributed was in fact
received by the schools (Reinikka and Svens-
son 2001). The median amount was even
zero! The extent to which corruption, while
obviously important, is the major culprit is
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Table 4.
Social indicators by region
Age Life Infant  Population Average
dependency expectancy  mortality growth years  of
ratio at birth rate (annual %) schooling
East Asia & Pacific 0.5 68.9 35.3 1.1 6.0
Europe & Central Asia 0.5 68.9 21.6 0.1 9.7
Latin America & Caribbean 0.6 69.7 30.8 1.6 5.4
Middle East & North Africa 0.7 67.6 45.4 2.1 4.5
South Asia 0.7 62.3 75.1 1.9 3.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.9 50.4 91.8 2.6 3.6
World 0.6 66.8 54.5 1.4 6.5
Note: Data are for 1998 except for average years of schooling which pertain to population aged 25 and above in
1995. As the latter variable is from a different source, the composition of the regional groups might differ some-
what from those of the other variables.
Sources: Age dependency ratio, life expectance, infant mortality rate, and population growth are from World Bank
(2000). Average years of schooling are from Barro and Lee (2001).
30. The much faster growth of the total population relative to the working-age population is one of the most impor-
tant variables in explaining the differential in economic growth between Africa and other regions (Bloom and
Sachs 1998).
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while perhaps extreme, illustrates the diversity
of the problems facing African governments
that would like to improve service delivery in
the social sectors.
Thirdly, in Benin, Mali, Rwanda and
many other African countries the government
has provided university graduates with job
guarantees. Rodrik (1997) argues that there
are good reasons for this in countries charac-
terised by a great deal of undiversifiable risk.
That is, in such environments, which include
most African countries, public employment is
a form of social insurance. Rodrik (1997)
claims that his regression analysis based on a
worldwide sample supports this assertion
against the alternative hypothesis that the
growth of public pay rolls is due to calcula-
tions of political gain. However, these two
hypotheses are not mutually incompatible; if
hiring people are to benefit politicians, public
sector jobs must be attractive relative to avail-
able alternatives and this could for example be
due to security of tenure. Moreover, it is 
difficult to see only considerations of social
welfare behind the 7.6% annual increase in
public sector employment in Zambia over
1966–1980, the expansion of 15% per year in
Ghana during 1975–82, or the 15.8% yearly
growth rate in Nigeria from 1977 to 1983.31
In any case, if all individuals with a higher
degree become bureaucrats, it is questionable
whether their education contributes much to
economic growth. It is, though, clear that in
these circumstances the private sector will not
benefit from the expansion of higher educa-
tion. 
Macroeconomic policy volatility
We have seen that the level and quality of pub-
licly provided inputs which are important for
private investors might explain why these
actors have been reluctant to commit their
capital to African projects. We shall see that it
is also easy to find examples of other economic
policies that might have contributed nega-
tively in this respect. It is obvious that
government policies on issues like profit tax-
ation and exchange rates matter to investors
since these will have a substantial impact on
the after-tax returns to investment. In addi-
tion to the level effects of such variables, their
variability matters because most investment
decisions are irreversible to some extent. That
is, once the decision is made the full value of
the investment cannot be recaptured. There-
fore, changes in government policies affecting
the profitability of the venture cannot change
the investment decision once it is made. How-
ever, the possibility of such changes might
affect the original decision on whether to
commit funds. 
The perceived riskiness of investing in
Africa is high. It is actually higher than war-
ranted by economic fundamentals: Haque,
Mark, and Mathieson (2000) show that the
evaluations of major risk rating agencies are to
a large extent determined by economic
factors, and that Africa’s rating is below what
one would predict based on its economic char-
acteristics. One possible explanation for a sig-
nificantly negative African dummy is that the
region is paying for its past misdemeanours.
Haque, Mark, and Mathieson (2000) find
that the ratings are highly persistent even after
controlling for various economic and political
determinants, so the poor standing of Africa
might be due to its uninspiring performance
in the past. Some support for this interpreta-
tion is provided by Jasperson, Aylward, and
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31. The first number is from Gelb, Knight, and Sabot (1991) and the latter two from Lindauer, Meesook, and Sueb-
saeng (1988).
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significant African dummy in regressions for
the ratio of FDI to GDP. They also show that
risk ratings have a negative effect on private
investment.
A second possibility is that the un-
explained residual riskiness of Africa is due to
the variability of the conditions facing
investors more than the average. Measures of
e.g. policy uncertainty are not included in the
regressions of Haque, Mark, and Mathieson
(2000). In judging the contribution of un-
certainty about macroeconomic policy to the
lacklustre private willingness to invest, we
might benefit from going back to our discus-
sion about the various shocks to which
African economies are subjected. A useful
starting point when looking for the links
between exogenous shocks and policy volatil-
ity is an observation made by Deaton and
Miller (1996: 123) about the terms of trade:
“[a]lthough there is still dispute about long-
term trends, the trend, if present, is not large
relative to variability, so that the important
thing is not to be misled by booms and slumps
into predicting any major change in long-run
values.” African governments, however, do
not seem to have thought along these lines.
There are many examples of pro-cyclical poli-
cies and of failures to adjust policies to take
account of the fact that prices have usually
returned to previous levels after relatively
short periods of time.32
Hence, it may be argued that the post-
independence governments of Africa have not
been sufficiently prudent.33 The permanent
income theory tells us that it is optimal 
to adjust consumption instantaneously to
shocks that alter the long-run level of income
while consumption should be approximately
constant when shocks are transitory. The
evidence illustrates that it can hardly be
claimed that in general African governments
have followed the prescriptions of this theory.
In some cases it is only a slight exaggeration
to say that the government has treated all
positive shocks as permanent and all negative
shocks as transitory. This is one of the reasons
why thirty-four of forty-two so-called highly
indebted countries are African and why in
1995 the average external debt to GNP ratio
was a whopping 72.3%, almost twice the aver-
age of the second most indebted region, Latin
America. 
This sort of behaviour has been all the
more serious insofar as terms-of-trade in-
stability, or more generally, instability in
export earnings usually has a major impact on
government budgets in Africa. First of all, in
countries with large mining industries, the
governments have appropriated a large share
of the resource rents either directly, by nation-
alising the industries, or indirectly through
profit taxation or royalties. Consequently,
they have borne the brunt of the burden from
fluctuations in the prices of minerals and
metals in world markets. Secondly, govern-
ment controlled marketing boards have been
widespread in countries where agricultural
exports have been important. These were
monopolies. The farmers had to sell their
products to the boards, which fixed the prices.
These were often kept constant for long peri-
ods of time. This practice stabilised the
incomes of the farmers, usually at a level that
implied a handsome monopoly profit, while
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32. See e.g. the case studies in Collier, Gunning, and associates (1999).
33. Nevertheless, the story is not complete without stressing the difficulties involved in forecasting commodity
prices. Deaton and Miller (1996) show how remarkably far off the World Bank has been in some of its estimates.
Given the low level of human capital in Africa, forecast errors are thus to be expected.
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revenues, which as a consequence fluctuated
with the world prices of the commodities con-
trolled by the boards. Thirdly, export taxes has
been another major source of government
revenues. Shocks to the value of exports have
thus been transformed into shocks to govern-
ment revenues. In turn, this has often engen-
dered expenditure instability (Bleaney, Gem-
mell, and Greenaway 1995). With limited
access to external funds and lacking domestic
bond markets, inflationary finance has been
the only other way of adapting to revenue
fluctuations. Where this route has been
chosen, both fiscal and monetary policy have
become destabilised.
These  “examples” should suffice to
demonstrate that policy volatility has been
high in Africa. That such instabilities have had
a negative impact on investment and growth
in Africa has also been confirmed empiri-
cally.34 Here most African governments could
profit by taking a leaf out of the book of the
government of Botswana, whose macroeco-
nomic management has been exemplary over-
all. Notably, Botswana has been politically
stable too, thus avoiding another of the risks
that restrict private investment in Africa.35
Public finance
The volatility of macroeconomic and fiscal
policy have probably been more important to
the disappointing African performance in
recent decades than the levels of these policies.
The average rate of inflation has been quite
low in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example. It
could even be argued that tax rates could have
been higher if more rational tax systems were
put in place. In any case, there is certainly a
need for higher public revenues if the debt
overhang accumulated in African countries is
to be repaid. Most of the external debt of
Africa is public. Therefore, debt reduction
could have a positive impact on growth by
reducing the risk of higher future taxation if
one is able to resolve the paradox noted by Bill
Easterly (1999: 6), namely, that “a large group
of countries came to be defined as highly
indebted at the end of two decades of debt
relief and increased concessional financing”
(emphasis in original).36
Of course, in order to explain deficits one
cannot look solely at the revenue side of the
budget. Indeed, African governments seem to
have overspent relative to their capacity for
generating revenues. Public consumption in
Africa has consistently been above the average
for all developing countries from the 1960s on
(Commander, Davoodi, and Lee 1997). In
growth regressions, government consumption
net of expenditures on education, health, and
the military is consistently found to have a
negative impact on growth. This is usually
taken to imply that these expenditures, which
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34. See e.g. Hadjimichael et al. (1995), Serven (1997), and Mlambo and Oshikoya (2001). The macroeconomic
studies are supported by the microlevel investigations of Bigsten et al. (1999, 2000b), who find that in the
manufacturing sectors of Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe high levels of profits and gross
rates of return to capital coexist with low levels of investment, suggesting that the cost of capital is very high.
Their interpretation is that macroeconomic instability implies that the option of “waiting to see what happens”
is very valuable, thus driving up the rates of return at which it becomes optimal to invest. 
35. Consult, for instance, Serven (1997). Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor (1999) arrive at similar results with respect
to total investment. Both the latter study as well as that of Guillaumont, Jeanneney, and Brun (1999) suggests
that political instability also has a direct impact on growth in Africa, most likely through investment misallo-
cation. 
36. Alternatively, a greater part of aid flows to Africa might be spent in recipient countries; Devarajan, Rajkumar,
and Swaroop (1999) show that in their sample of eighteen African countries 31% of the marginal aid dollar has
been diverted to repaying principal on external concessionary debt. 
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As many African bureaucracies are overstaffed
this presumption does not seem out of place,
and there is probably scope for reducing such
expenditures. However, it might be equally
important to reallocate expenditure from
wages to spending on operations and mainte-
nance to avoid the all-too familiar phenom-
ena of dilapidated schools without school-
books or roads littered with potholes.
The second broad category of public
spending is on capital. The data of Easterly
and Rebelo (1993) show that in the 1980s, the
median average rate of total consolidated
public sector investment in GDP in African
countries compared quite favourably with
those of other regions in the Third World. In
fact, it was only surpassed by that of the
Middle East and North Africa. But there is
more to public investment than just the
absolute amount of money spent. These two
regions have put huge sums into public sector
enterprises. The World Bank has estimated
that the average share of state-owned enter-
prises in GDP in a group of Sub-Saharan and
North African countries was 14% in the
period 1978–91 (World Bank 1995b). This
was much higher than in the Asian and Latin
American countries investigated. The share of
these enterprises in gross domestic investment
was also higher than that of their counterparts
in these other regions, and their share of
employment was almost ten times as high. 
The public enterprises of Sub-Saharan
Africa are notoriously inefficient. There are a
variety of reasons for this, including the choice
of technologies unsuited to local conditions.
These industries were often capital-intensive,
and thus hardly appropriate targets for invest-
ment in countries were capital has been
extremely scarce. Given the limited size of
local markets and the lack of international
competitiveness, capacity utilisation has often
been very low. For example, “[i]n Tanzania,
the state-owned Morogoro shoe-factory, built
in the 1970s with a World Bank loan, never
manufactured more than 4 percent of its
supposed annual capacity” (World Bank
1995b: 35). In order to survive, such firms
had to be shielded from international compe-
tition, which only served to turn them into
monopolies. While capital-intensive, they
were often overstaffed due to political
demands. Over time their accumulated losses
have constituted a major drain on public
resources, as huge subsidies were required to
keep them afloat. Thus, they have contributed
to the debt problems of Africa, which in turn
have depressed private investment in the
region (Serven 1997, Mlambo and Oshikoya
2001).37
Industrial and trade policies
African governments have established public
enterprises in what was deemed strategic
sectors, for example mining. However, they
have also established such enterprises in a
range of other industries that are usually dom-
inated by private firms. This is a reflection of
the strategy of import-substitution. This
strategy, which was followed by most devel-
oping countries from the 1950s on, was based
on the idea that one had to industrialise in
order to become rich. Since industrialised
countries are indeed rich, the assumption did
not seem farfetched at the time, and moreover,
both western academics and multilateral insti-
tutions provided support for this strategy
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37. The superficially surprising result derived by Hadjimichael et al. (1995) – that in Sub-Saharan Africa, govern-
ment investment has an impact on growth that is five to six times the effect of private investment – can probably
to a large extent be explained by the fact that in their study the latter includes investment by public enterprises.
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not be “engines of growth”. Since it was
supposed, quite reasonably, that newly
established industries in developing countries
would not be internationally competitive,
trade barriers were erected to protect them. In
many countries, private industries did grow
behind such tariff walls. However, in a lot of
African countries the public sector assumed a
commanding role out of ideology or because
the private sector was seen as too weak to take
on this task.
Whether private or public these industries
have rarely become competitive internation-
ally. One major reason for this is that the tariff
wall was not lowered. Hence, these industries
never had to compete and so felt little inclina-
tion to become competitive. Moreover,
domestic markets were and are small in most
African countries. Thus the scale economies
that are important in many manufacturing
industries could not be achieved.38 As a conse-
quence, much of the investment that has taken
place in Africa has been inefficient. The aston-
ishing conclusion of Devarajan, Easterly, and
Pack (2001), that in Africa, neither private nor
public capital has been productive between
1970 and 1997, supports this contention.39 A
reallocation of capital to other sectors should
therefore increase income levels.
The gains from trade have been one of the
main tenets of economic theory for over two
hundred years. Still the optimality of free
trade remains controversial. While it is debat-
able whether moderate and temporary infant
industry protection is damaging to economic
prosperity, in Africa protection has until quite
recently seemed permanent. Moreover, it has
not been moderate. Most observers argue that
it is likely that restrictive trade policies have
contributed to the poverty of Africa.40 The
marginalisation of Africa in world trade is in
any case striking: Ng and Yeats (1997), for
example, cite an UNCTAD study which
report that Africa’s share of global exports have
fallen from 3.1% in 1955 to 1.2% in 1990.
Ng and Yeats’ (1997) own investigations show
that Africa has been losing ground both
because of declining market shares for their
major exports in the OECD and because trade
in these products have been growing more
slowly than the average level of trade. The first
effect alone amounts to annual trade losses of
$11 billion according to their calculations, a
figure that is equal to the aid flows the region
received from the OECD countries in 1991!
These authors argue that it is the restrictive
trade policies of African countries that explain
the marginalisation process.41
In addition, the industrial and trade poli-
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38. There is currently a debate over whether African can export manufactures, which pits Wood and Mayer (1998),
who argue that the region’s comparative advantage is in resource-intensive industries, against Collier (1998).
The latter claim that African manufacturing is currently not internationally competitive because of high trans-
actions costs, many of which are related to unfavourable policies and policy risk. However, while this argument
is clearly correct, the difficulties created by small domestic markets for building competitiveness in industries
with high fixed costs of production cannot be easily dismissed.
39. Equally amazing is the fact that private investment does have a positive impact on growth if Botswana, with
0.2% of the continent’s population, is included.
40. The static gains from trade seem indisputable. Both theoretically and empirically, controversy remains over
whether policies that restrict the openness of the economy damage long-term growth. In the African context,
Sachs and Warner (1997) argue that they have while Rodrik (1998b) claims that they have not. Block (2001),
who finds that openness does in general contribute to growth in his set of developing countries, uncovers a
statistically significantly stronger effect in Africa. This result fits well with the severely limited size of these
economies.
41. Overvaluation and variability of the real exchange rate are clearly major contributing factors too (see e.g.
Elbadawi 1998).
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inequitable. Agriculture, the main export
sector, has been subjected to high explicit or
implicit taxes. In Ghana, for instance, by 1981
the real producer price of cocoa was down to
13% of its 1963 level (Leith and Lofchie
1993: 232-233). While producers responded
by cutting production or smuggling it out of
the country, they could not prevent a huge
drop in living standards. This is an example of
the urban bias that has characterised eco-
nomic policies in Africa in the last decades.
The rural population, which is poorer than
the urban population, has had to shoulder the
burden of import-substituting industrialisa-
tion. This is one of the reasons why income
inequality is high in Africa.
The Political Economy of Economic
Policies in Africa
In light of our discussion of various economic
policies that have affected economic develop-
ment in Africa adversely, the natural question to
ask is why African governments have hung on
to policies long after it must have become appar-
ent that they were not working. One answer is
that over time those who benefited from these
policies became strong enough to protect their
positions. Another is that African regimes have
found their control over public sector enter-
prises and their influence over the profitability
of local industries through trade and industrial
policies useful for political purposes.42
This in turn reflects the nature of African
political regimes since independence and the
character of African societies. In order to
bolster their positions political leaders of
many African regimes have made extensive
use of the public pay roll. These leaders have
governed poor societies characterised by
potentially explosive cleavages along the lines
of region, ethnicity, or religion. Indeed, this
destructive potential has been unleashed in a
number of cases, of which the civil wars rav-
aging countries such as Angola, Sierra Leone,
and the former Zaire are but the starkest
examples.43It is easy to understand the attrac-
tion of public sector employment expansion
in such cases, particularly when coupled with
the restricted possibilities for generating
political patronage in an efficient manner in
countries with highly rudimentary tax and
transfer systems. In some cases African auto-
crats have succeeded in staying in power for
decades through a combination of skilfully
applying public largesse and judiciously hand-
picking people for high-ranking public office. 
The attractions of supreme power have
been increased by the possibilities for using
public office for personal gain. Many African
leaders have neither been averse to putting
their hands in the public purse nor to mani-
pulating public policy in exchange for bribes.
The temptation to engage in these practices
has probably been strengthened by the high
likelihood of losing office to potential com-
petitors for the rents from political monopoly
power or representatives of other ethnic
groups, and facilitated by lack of accounta-
bility characteristic of post-independence
African regimes.
As discussed above, the social structures of
most African societies are characterised by a
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42. See the classic on the politics of urban bias in Africa: Bates (1981). 
43. This is not to say that such cleavages necessarily caused these conflicts (though it is likely that in some cases they
have at least constituted ready-made coalitional fault lines). Collier and Hoeffler (1998, 2000) argue that the
evidence suggest that Africa’s extreme fragmentation in terms of ethnicity has reduced the probability of civil
war there, its average incidence of such conflicts instead being due to its economic characteristics (in particular,
its low level of income, but also to some extent its dependence upon the rents from primary commodity exports). 
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instance family ties or ethnicity. Members of
a network have obligations towards other
members. They are expected to cater to the
interests of fellow tribesmen or kin. Thus, if a
member of a particular network is a public
employee, he will, if possible, use his position
to the advantage of other members. This con-
tributes to the privatisation of the state that
African leaders have initiated. The enormous
drop in real civil service wages over the last
twenty years has accentuated the tendency for
bureaucrats to look after themselves and their
own instead of serving the public. The conse-
quences for the public sector have been dis-
turbing, if unsurprising. The quality of
African public administrations is low. Absen-
teeism, moonlighting and corruption are
commonplace.44 In some cases the govern-
ment has become incapable of delivering even
basic services to its citizens. 
The legendary autocrat President Mobutu
of Zaire, who amassed an astonishing personal
fortune abroad, characterised the situation in
his country in this way (quoted in Gould
1980: 49): “In a word, everything is for sale,
anything can be bough in our country. And in
this flow, he who holds the slightest cover of
authority uses it illegally to acquire money,
goods, prestige, or to avoid all kinds of obli-
gations”. The self-evident proposition that in
such circumstances economic development is
highly unlikely is confirmed by a rapidly
expanding number of empirical studies.45 A
major part of the current African malaise must
thus be attributed to the fragmented charac-
ter of African societies and to the leaders of
African states over the decades.46
Here too, Botswana points the way. Its
bureaucrats are chosen on merit and corrup-
tion has not been a problem. Political inter-
ference has been avoided to a large extent.
Thus, its civil service personnel approximate
the Weberian ideal, namely, that bureaucrats
should be competent individuals who follow
general rules laid down by their political supe-
riors. Botswana’s leaders have pursued the goal
of national development instead of personal
fortune. True, ethnic conflict has not been a
concern in Botswana, but the example of
Mauritius demonstrates that it is possible to
achieve economic progress in Africa’s ethni-
cally diverse states. In my view, it is far from
coincidental that on a continent desperately
in need of strengthening the private sector
these two countries have had the highest
shares of private investment in GDP (table 1,
Mlambo and Oshikoya 2001).47
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44. On changes in salary structures and levels of remuneration in African public sectors, see e.g. Lindauer, Meesook,
and Suebsaeng (1988) and Nunberg (1994). An example of the decline in both morale and control is the appear-
ance of “ghost workers”, i.e., employees who are on the payroll but do not work, with their salaries being collected
either by themselves or someone else. As many as 11,000 such ghosts were discovered in connection with the
civil service reforms in Ghana in the 1980s (Nunberg 1994).
45. The work of Phillip Keefer and Stephen Knack (e.g. Keefer and Knack 1997, Knack 1996, and Knack and
Keefer 1995) is representative of the literature documenting the importance of well-functioning institutions.
46. It must be admitted, though, that exactly how ethnic diversity affects economic development is not entirely
clear. For example, Easterly and Levine (1997) find that greater fragmentation monotonically leads to poorer
economic policies. Temple (1998) also uncovers evidence of a relationship to policies, but it is non-monotonic
with a medium level of ethnic diversity yielding the worst outcomes. Finally, Collier (2000) claims that in demo-
cracies ethnic fragmentation is not a problem, and in Collier (2001) argues that it is only ethnic domination
that results in poor economic performance and violent conflicts. 
47. The quality of governance is of course inherently hard to measure. The best indicators available are probably
those constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton (1999a,b), who use most other available measures
as the basis for their estimates. The result is six aggregate indicators for 1997/98: Voice and accountability, Polit-
ical instability and violence, Government effectiveness, Regulatory burden, Rule of law, and Graft. On every 
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During the Cold War, Africa was part of the
battleground between East and West. The
economic and military support that were
provided allowed some dictators to stay in
power for longer than they would otherwise
have been able to, and conflicts such as the
civil war in Angola were fuelled by external
intervention in African politics. This has
clearly set back the pace of economic devel-
opment in parts of the region. Leaving geo-
politics aside, there are two main ways in
which it is conceivable that external actors
have influenced the trajectory of African
economies in the post-independence period:
their policies with respect to trade and aid,
respectively.
It is commonly held that the industrialised
countries have taken a protectionist stance
towards the exports of poor countries. This is
certainly true for many developing countries,
but those in Africa have in general faced quite
favourable terms. First of all, most African
countries qualify for trade preferences under
the GSP-systems of the OECD-countries.
While these preferences are provided on a dis-
cretionary basis (and so to some extent have
been uncertain) and have excluded some
potentially important exports (textiles and
clothing in the US, for example), this suggests
that Northern protectionism is not a major
factor behind the marginalisation of Africa in
world trade. This argument is strengthened by
two facts: 1) all former colonies of members
of the European Union have been parties to
the various Lome-conventions, and so have
received better market access there than other
developing countries; and 2) many African
countries are designated as “least developed”
by the UN, and the least developed countries
generally receive better terms under the GSP
than the rest of the developing world. Hence,
while there are obvious ways to improve the
market access of Africa in the industrialised
world, for example, by extending quota- and
tariff-free access to all African countries in all
QUAD-markets, the aid policies of the rich
countries have probably been of greater
importance to Africa than their trade policies.
Sub-Saharan Africa is the region that has
received the largest aid flows relative to the
domestic economy, however that is measured.
Table 5 illustrates that the level of aid has been
sizeable in relation to income per capita,
investment, and imports throughout the post-
independence period. In 1990, inflows of aid
amounted to more than a third of income per
capita, almost 60% of investment, and a quar-
ter of the region’s imports. Moreover, the
importance of aid has been increasing until it
peaked in the early 1990s. And even though
in general aid fatigue has set in among donors,
Africa has been accorded priority: its share of
effective aid has gone up, at least until 1995.
We have seen that in spite of this, African
growth has been poor. The World Bank argues
that this illustrates a general result. In its major
recent study on aid effectiveness, Assessing Aid
(World Bank 1998b), it charges that on
average aid has not contributed to growth in
developing countries. Based on Burnside and
Dollar (2000), another claim is presented in
this report: that aid works in good policy
environments. While this result is not robust,
it seems intuitively reasonable that aid has a
greater impact when economic policies are
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one of these, the average and median values for the African countries included are worse than those for the
sample as a whole. On three out of six measures, Botswana is on top in Africa (it is fourth on Voice and account-
ability, second best on Political instability and violence, and third on Rule of law). Mauritius is the leading
African country on the three remaining indicators.
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experience certainly does not contradict this
line of reasoning.
Both donors and recipients might be
faulted. As noted, some donors have given aid
for strategic purposes. Others have let their aid
flow to where their commercial interests have
been. Most donors have meddled in the affairs
of recipient countries in order to further their
goals or to try to make sure that the money
was spent for its intended purposes, although
poor policies have in general not been a major
concern. While aid agencies are entitled to
monitor how recipients spend their grants, the
proliferation of actors with which the latter
must deal has constituted a heavy burden on
their bureaucracies. Furthermore, aid flows
have been highly volatile as well as pro-cyclical
(Bulir and Hamann 2001, Pallage and Robe
2001), complicating economic policy-
making in the recipient countries in general
and macroeconomic management in particu-
lar. For their part, recipients have not always
spent the funds wisely. Given that aid is to
some extent fungible, that a lot of public
spending in Africa has been inefficient, and
that corruption has been a severe problem in
many countries, it seems safe to say that the
returns to aid have been far below potential.
The disappointing performance of African
economies with respect to poverty and growth
strengthens this sad conclusion.
Donors have not only been proffering
money; they have been pushing a lot of pol-
icy advice too. In the early days it was eco-
nomic infrastructure that was the key to devel-
opment. Later on basic needs were argued to
be as important as aggregate growth, before
getting the prices right became the rallying cry
that most of the international aid community
united behind. These days good governance is
perhaps the most popular word in the donors’
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48. The conclusions of Assessing Aid have not gone unchallenged. Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001) demonstrate the
fragility of the main result of Burnside and Dollar (2000), and assert that they find an unconditional positive
effect of aid on growth, but with decreasing returns. The latter result, however, only begs the question of why
there are decreasing returns to aid. Moreover, the policy measure used by Burnside and Dollar (2000) could
surely be improved upon, so that showing that the interaction of the measure with aid is not statistically
significant cannot be said to prove that the effect of aid does not strengthen with policies. 
Table 5.
Aid in Africa
1960 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 Latest
Effective aid (share of total) n.a. n.a. 21.0 25.7 34.7 37.0 41.7
Aid/GNP n.a. 2.5 3.5 3.9 6.0 9.9 4.1
Aid per capita (current $) 1.5 3.9 10.6 21.0 20.8 36.2 20.6
Aid (% of gross domestic investment) n.a. 15.0 14.4 19.1 40.5 58.3 22.3
Aid (% of imports) n.a. n.a. 9.1 11.4 17.9 25.3 10.6
Notes: Effective aid is grants plus the grant component of concessional loans. The latest figure for effective aid is for
1995. For the other indicators, the latest observation is from 1998.
Sources: Africa’s share of total effective aid (official development assistance and official aid) is calculated by the author
from the data in Chang, Fernandez-Arias, and Serven (1998). The other indicators are from World Bank (2000).
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donor side have implied that their advice has
been almost as unstable as the policies of
African governments. While the World Bank
now advocates using dialogue to persuade the
governments of recipient countries that have
not yet started to adopt the policies belonging
to the “Washington Consensus”, this brief
review should remind us that remedies for
conditions as severe as those of African
economies are not readily available. The
donors are in the business of selling hope, but
perhaps we have been aiming too high. After
all, the industrialised countries spent more
than a few decades on getting where they are
today. So maybe Abernethy (1988: 208-209)
is right:
“The African case may be thus be one in
which, tragically, neither the public or the
private sector is well-positioned to initiate
and maintain the economic development the
region’s people desperately seek. The under-
developed economy may indeed be kept in
place by the overdeveloped – or at least
overextended – state. At the same time the
overdeveloped state may be kept in its place
by the underdeveloped economy.”
To put this in a slightly different way: if one
believes, as I do, that Africa’s institutions play
a large role in explaining the lack of economic
progress, for all the reasons explored in this
essay, then perhaps one should not expect
revolutionary changes.49 Institutions only
change slowly, inertia being part of the defin-
ition of an institution. Hence the forces that
have lead to the adoption of growth-retarding
policies, to the “privatisation” of public
administrations, and to warlords playing
major roles in the politics of the region will
not yield easily. This does not mean that the
status quo is inevitable, only that enduring
progress might be better secured by adapting
our efforts at aiding Africa to the pace of
change that its peoples choose. 
Concluding Remarks
What have we learned? I would argue that
there are four major lessons. First of all,
Africa’s location on the map of the world, its
physical geography, and its colonial past con-
stitute real impediments to economic devel-
opment. Secondly, in many of the region’s
states the pursuit of ill-conceived and poorly
executed policies has made the negotiation of
these formidable obstacles even more diffi-
cult. Thirdly, there are intimate links between
the region’s structural characteristics and its
policy regimes. Some of these links are eco-
nomic (terms of trade volatility complicating
macroeconomic management in countries
with poorly developed financial systems, for
example); others, like the impact of primor-
dial affiliations and personal relationships on
governance, are social and political. Stated
differently, economic policies, political in-
stability, and bureaucratic corruption are
endogenous variables, and what I have called
structural characteristics are exogenous, or at
least predetermined, with respect to the
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49. Chabal and Daloz (1999: 137) espouse a similar point of view: “It is … entirely possible that the continent’s
economic outlook will remain unconventional: an economy of exchange (barter, even) rather than the more
orthodox economy of accumulation, investment, transformation and production predicted by Western theories
of economic development. Similarly, Africans may well stay resolutely inimical to the growth of an atomized,
individualistic, mass society where solidarity counts for little. Consequently, it is conceivable that the continu-
ation of such communal links will prevent the emergence of individual citizenship, as it will the construction
of an institutionalized state. This, in any case, is what has happened to date on the continent.”
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African countries the equilibrium outcome is
apparently to be stuck in a poverty trap. 
How, then, are we to account for the few
cases of material progress and political stabil-
ity? Initial conditions vary, of course, and
sometimes seemingly small or arbitrary events
might put two fairly similar countries on dif-
ferent paths to the future. However, the
circumstances in which the lone star per-
former of Africa, Botswana, found itself at
independence show that initial conditions are
not destiny. Its colonial heritage in terms of
physical and social infrastructure was negli-
gible. The reason for this lack of interest on
the part of Britain, so great that it actually
ruled the country from South Africa, was that
the prospects of Botswana were not consid-
ered to be bright enough to warrant large-scale
expenditures. Indeed, its natural resource
endowment as of 1965 was more of a liability
than an asset, the country being small, semi-
arid, drought-prone, and land-locked. The
situation changed with the discovery of rich
diamond deposits. Nevertheless, as I argued
above, the main moral of Botswana’s rags-to-
riches story is that its good fortune is man-
made, through high-quality policies and gov-
ernance, and not merely bestowed on it. Actu-
ally, the limited involvement of the colonial
power might have been as much of a blessing
(in disguise, though) as the diamonds, since it
allowed the people of Botswana a free hand in
creating the institutions the newly indepen-
dent state required.
Returning to the realities facing most other
African countries, what can we make of the
fact that in many corners of the region, eco-
nomic and political reforms have been insti-
gated over the last decade and have resulted in
economic growth? One possibility is that at
times, crises beget policy changes. Perhaps the
economy had deteriorated to a state where
even those who benefited from the previous
policy regimes in these countries would gain
from a switch to growth-promoting policies?
If that is the case, one should not be too san-
guine about future prospects, as it seems likely
that these forces might reassert themselves
when the economy picks up. An alternative
explanation is that external pressure has forced
these governments into adjustment mode.
Even if that was true, in spite of the established
failure of traditional aid conditionality, the
conclusion would be just as pessimistic,
because the external pressure will fade if
reforms succeed and so the impetus to sustain
them will disappear. Both of these explana-
tions would mean that the reforms would lack
credibility and therefore be unlikely to result
in a sustained improvement in economic per-
formance. The less than impressive growth
rates of “strong reformers” over the 1990s as
well as the persistence of risk ratings indicate
that this might be a problem.50
Moreover, one must not forget that it is
fairly easy to achieve fast growth when one
starts from a low base. If the starting point is
the result of war a return to peace will allow
displaced peasants to return to their land and
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50. If one takes the five countries that the World Bank (1994) reckons have achieved the greatest reduction in gov-
ernment intervention as of late 1992 (i. Guinea, ii. The Gambia, iii. Guinea-Bissau, iv. Mozambique, and v.
Sierra Leone; calculated from tables A12 and A13) and the top five countries in terms of improvement in macro-
economic policies from 1980-86 to 1987-91 (i. Ghana, ii. Tanzania, iii. The Gambia, iv. Zimbabwe, Nigeria,
and Burkina Faso; taken from table B1) to create a list of “strong reformers”, their growth rates over 1990–98
are neither uniformly high nor uniformly higher than those of other African countries. If GDP per capita is
measured in constant local currency units, I find that Mozambique, in sixth place (out of forty-four) with an
annualised growth rate of 3.4%, does best among the reformers. Six of the ten strong reformers had negative
growth rates. 
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public works, but these effects will subside
within a few years. If a severely distorted
policy regime is reformed, even if only par-
tially, growth will increase rapidly, but this will
partly be a statistical mirage. Individuals who
have retreated into the informal urban sector
or subsistence farming in order to avoid the
heavy hand of the state will slowly return to
activities in the formal sector, but much of the
change will just be due to the latter being
recorded by statisticians.51
There is no questioning the need for effi-
cient public spending on infrastructure,
health, and education or the potentially ben-
eficial effects of foreign aid if genuine policy
reform is implemented. What is questionable
is whether sustained reform, efficient spend-
ing, and improved governance currently con-
stitute a socio-political equilibrium in most
African countries. But the final, most impor-
tant lesson we have learned is that it is up to
the Africans themselves to establish a new
equilibrium. So we must hope that new gen-
erations of Africans will work out how to
ensure that their countries follow the lead of
Botswana along the path to prosperity.
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